Opinion of the Court — Gonzalez-Corona v. Immigration & Naturalization Service

This writing

Type: Opinion of the Court
Filed: June 17, 2002
Case: Gonzalez-Corona v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
Case status: Decided

Source No authoring judge could be established for this writing, either from provider metadata or from the signature line of the court's published opinion. Benchlight shows the gap rather than guessing at an author.

Opening text

The first passage of the document, as extracted by the source provider.

MEMORANDUM ** Adolfo Gonzalez-Corona petitions for review of the final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of his application for suspension of deportation. Pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), the transitional rules apply, see Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.1997), and we therefore have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), as amended by IIRIRA § 309(c), see Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192 , 1195 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition for review. Gonzalez-Corona contends that § 309(c)(5) of IIRIRA deprives him of due process because it is unconstitutionally vague in its application of the “stop-time rule.” We disagree. In Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 516 (9th Cir.2001), we held that there is “only one reasonable interpretation” of § 309(c)(5)— that it applies to transitional rule aliens such as Gonzalez-Corona. Accordingly, § 309(c)(5) is not unconstitutionally vague. Gonzalez-Corona further contends that the statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to individuals convicted of certain crimes. Gonzalez-Corona lacks standing to …

Source Extract supplied by CourtListener. Benchlight does not host the document — read the authoritative text in the court's own PDF.